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Abstract—One of the major concerns cloud computing plat-
forms face today is the lack of a unique identification of
the ”who” within the network infrastructure. State-of-the-art
technologies (such as VLANs or IP addresses) lack functionality
to cope with the highly dynamic and scalable, ever changing
and virtualized cloud-enabled data center infrastructures. A
shared and limited address space or the loss of identification
across boundaries render classification unusable for per-tenant,
per-service or per-cloud-provider policies. In this work, we
introduce the concept of a classification mechanism that is
fine-grained enough to associate tenants, services and cloud
providers to their network streams. The Tenant-ID, Service-ID
and Cloud-ID is added as a tag to Layer 3 packets throughout
the consumer-to-service communication. We argue that the
proposed service and tenant isolation concept is generic enough
to be applicable across the whole cloud environment, thereby
eliminating current limitations and enabling new network
functionality.
Keywords-Cloud Computing, “Identity Crisis”, classification,
multi-tenancy, per-tenant policy, per-service policy, tenant iso-
lation, service isolation
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud Computing has emerged as a new IT paradigm
over the last couple of years. It is clearly distinguished from
previous service delivery models by introducing on-demand
self-service, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid
elasticity and measured services. It is heavily based on vir-
tualization, enabling ubiquitous, convenient and on-demand
network access to a shared pool of compute, network and
storage resources.
A key issue in Cloud Computing is the context-based
classification of service and tenant assets across different
boundaries. Classification is used to implement policies that
define the “who, what, where, when and how”. If we cannot
identify and isolate the “who” on the network layer, we
cannot define and implement any of the others. Current
Layer 2/3/4 attributes are no longer sufficient to uniquely and
in a uniform way identify the “who” in a cloud-enabled data
center network. A more fine-grained classification is needed
to introduce (1) visibility of services and tenants within the
network, (2) control, and (3) effective management. The
white-paper “Identity-aware Networking” published by the
Enterprise Strategy Group (ESG) [1] states the need for
identity awareness and classification on the network layer
as follows: “large organizations need the network to enable
any user to connect securely to applications and services
from any network using any device.”
In this paper, we answer the following questions: (1) How
can we classify cloud service and tenant assets in a uniform
way across boundaries? (2) How can we enable visibility of
services, tenants and their data in cloud data centers? (3)
How can we translate business needs into network policies?
Our Contributions:
• We introduce current classification mechanisms used in
cloud environments and how they are lacking function-
ality to perform well in a dynamic and ever-changing
environment.
• We develop a new concept that allows classification
of cloud providers, their services and tenants across
boundaries. We show how to perform classification
on the network layer within and outside of a cloud
provider.
• We present a design of a cloud enabled data center,
which shows how provider, service and tenant classifi-
cation enables answering the “who, what, where, when
and how.”
Section 2 identifies the classification crisis and defines
the problem space with the help of an example. Section 3
discusses the limitations seen in current technologies and
outlines the problematic for cloud environments. Section 4
defines functional limitations due to the lack of fine-grained
classification. In Section 5 we introduce the identification
scheme, which is followed by a discussion on benefits in
Section 6. The Technical realization is outlined in Section
7 followed by a discussion, future work, and conclusion
section.
II. CLASSIFICATION CHALLENGES IN CLOUD
COMPUTING
Our identity is a key element of our day-to-day lives. It is
used to identify us and our assets (e.g., bank accounts, jobs,
etc.) and links both closely together.
In Cloud Computing, however, our identity is decoupled
from our assets. We refer to assets as components used or
generated as part of a cloud service, including but not limited
to VMs or traffic streams. Today, these assets cannot be
easily associated to their owner’s identity.
Identity, in its original sense, is used to describe users’
authentication information, associated authorization and ac-
counting details. Here, we extend the meaning of a users
identity to its assets.
To better highlight the classification challenges in cloud
computing we define an example around the service provider
Dropbox (consumer-based cloud storage). A Dropbox con-
sumer is any user who is registered with the Dropbox
service. Dropbox chooses an Infrastructure provider like
Amazon or Google. We assume that Dropbox runs its ser-
vices on Amazon. This already shows one of the challenges
Cloud Computing introduces. Dropbox is a service provider
to its own consumers. At the same time, it is a consumer of
the cloud provider Amazon.
We now introduce the concept of a tenant in a service
offering. Amazon considers Dropbox a tenant of its infras-
tructure service. At the same time however, Dropbox offers
their services to consumers. These consumers can be seen
as tenants of Dropbox. With this example, it becomes clear
that a tenant can exist on different levels of the cloud service
offering model. To avoid confusion, we will use ”tenant” to
describe an end-user of a service provider.
After introducing the concept of tenants across the differ-
ent service offerings we now look at multi-tenancy. Multi-
tenancy is mainly seen in a cloud provider (referred to as
CP) such as Amazon or Google. It describes the shared
resource utilization within the CPs infrastructure. The CP
gains advantages including (1) better resource utilization,
(2) rapid elasticity, and (3) on-demand self-service.
However, from a tenant’s perspective, multi-tenancy is not
always beneficial. A tenant of Dropbox might worry that the
used infrastructure is shared with other tenants (may that be
a tenant of Dropbox or Amazon itself). Multi-tenancy and
its impact to tenants heavily relies on the service model
used. Amazon, offering Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS),
uses multi-tenancy to share physical servers among many
different tenants.
Here, the isolation between tenants relies on the hy-
pervisor and the network infrastructure. Dropbox, offering
Software-as-a-Service (SaaS), uses multi-tenancy on the
application layer to provide access to the SaaS App to many
consumers.
Within the SaaS APP, the isolation between tenants is
based on user accounts within the application. DataBase
isolation is often used to provide multi-tenancy in Platform-
as-a-Service (PaaS) as seen in salesforce Apps.
III. EXISTING TECHNOLOGIES AND THEIR
CLASSIFICATION LIMITATIONS
A. State-Of-The-Art Network IDs
Network IDs have been used for decades in network
computing to identify network assets, may it be for (1)
forwarding elements or (2) end hosts. Cloud providers lever-
age VLANs, IP addresses, port numbers and other network,
compute and storage-specific resource identifiers to address
elements. For many years, the existing identifiers have been
sufficient to uniquely address entities.
At first glance, it may seem that these IDs are sufficient
to uniformly link identities to their assets in a multi-tenancy
environment as well. This initial perception however, fails
to take into account that most of the IDs have been defined
for different purposes. VLANs and IPs are not designed
to address entities used by many different tenants at the
same time (as it is the case in a virtualized multi-tenant
environment).
The address space of legacy IDs is too small to cover large
cloud deployments with hundreds or thousands of tenants
and services. Recent attempts to solve this (by introducing
overlay solutions such as VxLANs [2] ) however, fail to
address the second, more important, problem. Siloed IDs
identify assets that belong to (or are used by) a tenant but
cannot be easily associated with the tenant.
Siloed IDs cause problems for (1) managing tenants and
their assets, (2) identifying exact resource usage across net-
work, storage and compute elements, (3) behavior discovery
among tenants for eCommerce purposes, and (4) applying
tenant specific policies to enable business needs.
With the introduction of Cloud Computing, network IDs
have dominated discussions on how to adapt them to the
virtualized, dynamic and agile infrastructure of a cloud
environment. In legacy networks, matching traffic against
their VLAN, IP or port affiliation often has been granular
enough to accurately define business related policies. How-
ever, with Cloud Computing, simply relying on VLANs, IP
addresses or port numbers as classification mechanisms, is
not sufficient anymore. State-of-the-art network identifiers
are now shared among many different tenants.
B. Uniform Resource Identifier (URI)
Based on a string of characters, a Uniform Resource
Identifier (URI) [3] allows the identification of a web re-
source. They are distinguished by locators (Unified Resource
Locator or URL) and names (Unified Resource Name or
URN). The URN defines an entity’s identity while the URL
provides means for finding it. URIs are heavily used to share
a web service within a cloud provider among many tenants.
As part of HTTP, URIs are located on Layer 7 of the OSI
model. Hence, classifying traffic based on URIs requires
deep-packet-inspection. This typically results in high latency
for the tenant. We argue that URIs are not sufficient to
provide a uniform classification to enables service and tenant
visibility within a network environment.
C. HTTP - Virtual Hosting
Based on HTTP 1.1 [4] Virtual Hosting [5] allows web-
servers to host more than one website. The multiplexing can
either happen on an IP or URL-name basis. This technique
is seen as one of the first resource sharing technologies
allowing multiple tenants to host their websites on one
physical server. Here, each tenants website is either iden-
tified via a unique IP or a unique name that translates to
a single IP address. Without this unique identification it
would be impossible to enable this multiplexing of websites.
If the multiplexing is done using different URL-names,
identification of services on Layer 3 of the OSI model is
impossible without performing further packet inspection.
D. HTTPS - TLS and Server Name Indication
Server Name Indication is used within TLS [6] based
connections such as seen with HTTPS [7]. The destination
URL is transmitted as part of the three-way handshake. It
allows a web-server to host multiple HTTPS based website
offering a certificate per side.
The unique identification of multiple HTTPS based web-
sites hosted on the same physical server is done on a
certificate basis. This approach allows the client to validate
the certificate received for a specific secure website. Website
specific certificates enable the end-user to trust the connec-
tion and therefore the service offered by the website.
This technology is not feasible for non-HTTPS applica-
tions. It is therefore not generic enough to be used as a
classification method for services and tenants in a Cloud
environment.
E. IP Address Sharing Solutions
IEFT RFC 6269 [8] introduces several new technologies
that tackle the issue of address sharing among many con-
sumers. This RFC introduces the solutions in regards to
broadband access. However, they are also relevant to Cloud
Computing and hence are briefly introduced in this section.
The introduced proposals extend the address space by adding
port information. RFC 6269 covers (1) Carrier Grade NAT,
(2) Large Scale NAT, (3) Dual-Stack Lite, (4) NAT 64, (5)
Address+Port proposals and (6) Stateless Address Mapping.
For further details on each technologies refer to references .
F. Security Group Tag
The term “Security Group Tag” (SGT) [9] is defined
as part of Cisco’s Identity product suite. SGT enables
the meaningful translations of business terms into network
policies. As the term suggests it classifies systems or users
based on their context including (1) user role, (2) device, (3)
location or (4) access method. This classification can then be
used by firewalls, routers and switches to make forwarding
or blocking decisions in a Data Center.
Security Group Tags are limited to the local Data Center.
Hence, the grouping or classification is lost as soon as traffic
leaves the network boundaries. In addition, the classification
is based on context groups (e.g., departments) and is therfore
not granular enough to be used on a per-tenant basis.
G. IDs and Their Boundaries
With the diversity of IDs, both legacy and cloud specific,
it is important to understand their boundaries. This section
summarizes previous ones by compiling a list of IDs, their
positioning on the OSI model, the address space and their
significance boundaries (refer to Table I). One or many of
the shown IDs are needed to establish Layer 2 to Layer 4
connectivity to services.
IV. CLASSIFICATION RELATED FUNCTIONALITY
LIMITATIONS
A. Within the Cloud
1) Accurate Billing: How are tenants billed if a CP
cannot track their usage of resources within the cloud
environment? The utilization of the network is currently
not reflecting each tenants behavior. Hence, a CP trying to
bill a tenant according to their usage of network devices
such as (1) switches, (2) firewalls or (3) load-balancers is
nearly impossible. Amazon defines their EC2 pricing scheme
[10] on compute and storage resources used. Billing its
services according to their usage of network resources is
not possible as a unique link between the service and its
traffic is not given. Here, this means that there is no way
to determine what network resources the Amazon service
Dropbox leverages to send and receive traffic.
2) Converting Business Needs to Security Policies:
Security is a hot topic for every company. In a cloud
environment, security is even more critical as all resources
are shared amongst many different tenant’s (often even
between competitors). Currently, CPs are lacking the right
tools and functionality to define specific security policies
for tenants or service assets. This is mainly caused by the
disconnect of tenant or service identities and their assets
within the network. In our example, security issues arise if
Dropbox as an IaaS customer of Amazon wants to apply per-
tenant security policies. Dropbox currently has no means to
distinguish its tenants on a network or transport layer. Hence,
applying inline security policies per-tenant is not possible.
3) Per-tenant QoS: Classification for Quality of Service
is based on either IntServ or DiffServ [11]. Both methods
introduce arbitrary characteristics to distinguish traffic flows.
This classification is often only based on the type of traffic
but not its tenant or service affiliation.
ID OSI Model Layer Address Space Boundary
VLAN Data Link 12 bit Valid within Layer 2 domain. Not carried across
layer 3. Not unique per tenant nor service.
MAC Data Link 48 bit Valid within layer 2 segment. Unique but config-
urable in virtualized environment.
Security Group Tag Data Link Layer
or independent
protocol
16 bit Cisco proprietary, within Data Center
VxLAN Layer 2.5 24 bit Within data center.
IPv4 Network 32 bit Non RFC-1918 addresses globally valid. Depending
on translation configured. Not unique per service.
IPv6 Network 128 bit Different address types with both local or global
significance. Not unique per service.
TCP/UDP port Transport 16 bit Transmitted as part of TCP/UDP header. Seen end-
to-end between sender and receiver. Not unique per
service.
Service User account ID Application protocol dependent Encrypted in transit. Only seen on application layer
Table I: Layer 2 - 7 IDs: In a typical network many different identifiers are used to separate and identify traffic. In a cloud environment
those IDs are reused multiple times to cope with virtualized layers. This table introduces the different IDs seen in a cloud environment.
We show their address space and their boundaries.
4) Resource Orchestration Complexity: Cloud manage-
ment is getting more and more critical in orchestrating ser-
vices and tenants within minimal time frames. Orchestrating
a whole service within minutes requires the handling of
many different resources and spinning up of assets. Often,
management tools define network, compute and storage
resources without a uniform link between the new tenant
or service and the needed resources. This can be critical for
both Amazon as the CP but also for Dropbox as the service
running on top of Amazons IaaS infrastructure.
5) Service Stacking: In our example we introduced Ama-
zon as the underlying IaaS Service Provider. Dropbox, as a
tenant of Amazon, is a SaaS provider to its own customers.
This two layer service delivery approach is a typical scenario
for CPs and virtual Service Providers leveraging the CPs
infrastructure to offer SaaS or PaaS services. We refer to this
phenomenon in cloud environments as “Service Stacking”.
This and the unique identification of services is seen
as a challenge in Cloud Computing for tenant & service
identification. Running a SaaS over a PaaS over a IaaS
service obfuscates services in the network. Both SaaS and
PaaS services appear as the underlying IaaS service on the
lower layers of the OSI model. In our example, Dropbox
is obfuscated by Amazons underlying IaaS environment.
Without the use of deep-packet inspection and the use of
Layer 7 application data, services cannot be distinguished
within the lower layers (2-4).
6) Network, Compute and Storage Resource Abstrac-
tion: Resource abstraction from physical hardware is one
of the underlying concepts that enables auto-scaling and
proactive resource adjustment. Abstracting physical hard-
ware enables virtualization and brings several advantages
to a cloud architecture. However, the network, compute and
storage resource abstraction also causes problems in usage
identification and traffic isolation.
7) Virtual Service Providers: Our previous example in-
troduced Dropbox as a service provider offering consumer
storage capabilities and therefore can be referred to as a
Virtual Service Provider (VSP). A VSP relies on a CP to
provide the network infrastructure, Data Center facilities,
power and everything related to the physical implementation.
This concept originated in the telecommunication industry
where a Internet Service Provider (ISP) would rent out its
infrastructure to a VSP. In the telecommunication world the
identification of the tenants and its assets is standardized by
using a 10-digit unique number called mobile subscription
identification number (MSIN). That number, being part of
the international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI), allows
tracking a mobile phone uniquely within both the ISPs and
the VSPs environment.
However, in a Cloud Environment this concept is not
available. The VSP much less the CP are able to uniquely
track the behavior of a tenant or service and their related
assets. This increases the problematic of identifying services
both within and outside of a cloud infrastructure.
In a remote organizations network (e.g., Cisco Systems)
Dropbox traffic is identified as part of Amazon without
inspecting each packet more thoroughly. This lack of ten-
ant/service isolation introduces challenges for organizations
remote to the CP. Here, Cisco Systems would not be able
to identify traffic from Dropbox without looking at each
packets Layer 7 information. This deep packet inspection
causes high latency as its performed in software and is
therefore not viable on a large scale.
8) Complex Compute Infrastructures: Compute infras-
tructures can be highly complex with many different layers
of configuration. Identifying services or tenants and their
assets in those environments is critical to (1) simplify man-
agement, (2) enable resource tracking on compute infrastruc-
tures, and (3) ease troubleshooting tenant or service related
issues. Based on Cisco Systems Unified Computing System
(UCS) we demonstrate challenges seen with disconnected
service or tenant identities and related assets. Dropbox
serves as the service in this scenario. A service, especially
IaaS services, typically have (1) VMs, (2) virtual Routers,
(3) virtual service appliances, and (4) sometimes whole
blade servers dedicated to their compute infrastructure. The
resources needed or used depends on the complexity and
the utilization of the service. We assume that Dropbox has
VMs on a shared blade server within the UCS system. Those
VMs, deployed during the initialization of the service, often
have random and arbitrary names.
B. Outside The Cloud
In addition to challenges a CP is facing, Internet Service
Providers and remote network operators currently also lack
service or tenant awareness and classification within the
network layer. As a result an ISP cannot define fine-grained
routing decisions as often demanded to reflect cloud service
needs. Today, it is not possible to forward certain services
across links with better characteristics for a particular cloud
service. In our example that could mean that Dropbox is
send across links that are also used for low latency voice
and video traffic. Hence, both Dropbox and any other service
on that link are affected by higher latencies and therefore
decreased user experience.
A network operator, e.g. a remote organization such as
Cisco System, currently has limited means to filter particular
services from one CP without filtering all services. Amazon
is hosting a service that is violating Cisco Systems security
policies. Cisco needs to be able to block this particular
service while allowing other services such as Dropbox.
We can clearly see that without a unique identification and
classification of tenants or services and their assets, major
business requirements are not easily met.
V. THE IDENTIFICATION SCHEME
This paper introduces three IDs, the (1) Cloud-ID, (2)
Service-ID, and (3) Tenant-ID. Each ID is used to classify
traffic according to its affiliation with cloud providers, ser-
vices and tenants. We propose a 16 byte IPv4 or IPv6 header
increase with 4 bytes being reserved for the cloud provider,
6 bytes for its services and 6 bytes for the consumers.
A. Cloud-ID
The C-ID is intended to be used to uniquely identify
a cloud provider globally. Similar to the domain name
registration, we propose that multiple third parties will
allocate IDs to cloud providers and make such information
public. We propose a 4-byte (32-bit) number for the C-ID.
It consists of two parts. (1) The first part is a 10-bits registry
number, which encodes the registry service that assigns C-
IDs to cloud providers in its region. (2) The second part is
a 22-bit cloud number, which identifies a cloud provider.
Registry Location ID Value (Numeric - 10 bit)
USA 0001
GB 0002
DE 0003
AUS 0004
Table II: Registry Location ID: The first 10 bit of the Cloud-
ID are used to identify the location of the registry service used
to register a CP in a certain location. One CP can have multiple
”Registry Location IDs” to reflect its location.
The registry service is responsible for assuring unique-
ness, security in terms of Provider authentication and trans-
parency of easy lookup of C-ID values. Suppose a registry
service maintains a database of cloud providers that are ge-
ographically located within its service area, then the registry
number can provide useful information on the region where
a cloud is physically based. To demonstrate the concept we
identify several registries and corresponding C-IDs.
Cloud Provider ID Value (Numeric - 22 bit)
Amazon 1310010
Google 1310020
Microsoft 1310030
Nirvanix 1310040
Table III: CP-ID: The cloud provider ID needs to be unique
per Cloud provider. It is assigned per provider and unique across
different registry locations.
After defining the registry values for the first part of the
C-ID we provide an example of several cloud providers
identified within one location. For the purpose of this paper
we selected registry location USA with the registry value
of 001. The cloud provider part of the C-ID consists of
32 bits with more than 4 billion possible IDs. The cloud
provider part of the C-ID is chosen and managed by the
corresponding registry authority. The C-ID, as a combination
of the registry and the cloud provider ID is represented as
follows (based on the examples shown above).
Cloud-ID ID Value (Numeric - 48 bit)
Amazon 0001.1310010
Google 0001.1310020
Microsoft 0001.1310030
Nirvanix 0001.1310040
Table IV: Overall Cloud-ID: The Cloud-ID is defined as a
combination of the registry location ID and the actual CP ID.
A cloud provider can register with multiple registry ser-
vices depending on different locations of its data centers.
Ideally the cloud provider number is kept the same whereas
the registry number changes. For example, Amazon can
have two C-IDs, 0001.1310010 and 0002.1310010, reflecting
its cloud representation in the US and in Great Britain
respectively.
B. Service-ID
The S-ID is proposed to identify cloud-based services
from remote entities. It is managed and controlled by the
cloud provider and therefore does not require a public
registry service. Uniqueness is critical only within the cloud
providers environment making the usage of the S-ID more
straight forward. Similar to the C-ID, we propose a more
sophisticated format for the S-ID than just a plain number.
Having a pre-defined numbering scheme has the advantage
of incorporating information into the ID.
The Service ID is defined as a 6-byte numeric string. For
the purpose of the S-ID, we propose several sub-IDs defining
the following information.
Sub-ID Bits
Data Center within CP location 8 bit value
Service 32 bit value
Option 8 bit value
Table V: Service-ID sub-IDs: The service ID consists of three
sub-IDs defining the Data Center location, the Service itself and
optional values relevant to the service.
The above values are used to demonstrate the concept
of the three sub-IDs identified for the S-ID. The Service is
identified by a 15-bit number. Another 4 bits are reserved for
further information or to extend the 15-bit service number
if needed.
To show how the Service sub-IDs can be built, we
provide some examples. The first table shows three example
locations within the United States. These IDs add granularity
per Data Center within a certain country location.
Data Center within location ID Value (Numeric - 8 bit)
San Francisco 001
Boston 002
New York 003
Table VI: Data Center Location: The location of the Data Center
used for the particular service is encoded using a 8 bit numerical
value. One Service can have multiple locations.
Below we define the service value. For the purpose of
this paper, we leverage Amazon as an cloud provider. The
values are selected randomly.
Service ID Value (numeric - 32 bit)
Dropbox 25352
S3 23948
Salesforce 00617
Table VII: Service value: The Service-ID incorporates a 32-bit
numerical value that is used as the unique identifier for the Service
itself.
A cloud provider internal database is necessary to manage
service values and assure their uniqueness. After defining
both sub-IDs we can now show the full S-ID. In combination
with the C-ID the S-ID and its sub-IDs allow specifying the
location on a per-Data Center basis within a certain country.
For the purpose of this paper we assume that the optional
8-bit value is left blank, and is therefore showing a 000. The
table below shows S-IDs for three different services hosted
by the Amazon Cloud.
Final Service-ID ID Value (numeric - 6 byte)
Dropbox 001.2535200000.000
S3 002.2394800000.000
Salesforce 001.0061700000.000
Table VIII: Overall Service-ID: The Service-ID consists of
three sub-IDs defining its location, a unique identifier and options
relevant to the service. The option field is defined within a CP to
support meta data for a particular service.
C. Tenant-ID
We proposed a Tenant-ID on Layer 2 to allow the unique
classification of tenant specific traffic within VLANs and
Layer 2 segments. To leverage this classification for Layer
3 mechanisms we port the Layer 2 ID to Layer 3 and add
further metadata. The Tenant-ID on Layer 2 uses a 15-bit ad-
dress space. We propose to extend this address space to 48-
bits on Layer 3. The extended address space allows for even
more granular classification based on metadata describing
the tenant within a cloud environment. The overall structure
of the Layer 3 Tenant-ID is shown below:
Sub-ID Bits
Layer 2 Tenant-ID 16 bit value
Metadata 32 bit value
Table IX: Tenant-ID sub-IDs: The Layer 3 Tenant-ID is com-
posed of two sub-IDs. The first part describes the Layer 2 equiv-
alent that is used to classify tenants within a LAN segment. The
second part is an 32-bit optional field that allows the Cloud Provider
to add metadata to the ID.
The metadata is defined by the Cloud Provider and is
therefore not restricted. To classify traffic per tenant the
whole Layer 3 Tenant-ID is used. We argue that the meta
data added by the Cloud Provider has only local significance.
Outside of the Cloud Providers network the whole 48 bit are
considered to be the identifier for a certain Tenant. External
networks are not able to decode meta data incorporated
into the ID. Adding meta data to the Tenant-ID on Layer
3 enables the Cloud Provider with further classification
capabilities.
D. Scheme Characteristics
1) Hierarchical Relation Between IDs: The identifica-
tion scheme is based on a hierarchical approach. It is used
to show the relationship between different IDs. Each ID has
a direct relationship with another ID, may it be as a child
or as a parent.
A cloud provider only receives a single global ID. This ID
is used as the root for all following Service-IDs and Tenant-
IDs. One Cloud-ID can have one-to-many Service-IDs.
On the next Layer, each Service-ID is seen as the
root for the Tenant-IDs. Multiple Tenant-IDs are linked to
one Service-ID. As a tenant can leverage the offerings of
multiple services the relationship between Tenant-IDs and
Service-IDs can be many-to-many.
2) Identity Registration and Assignment: The registra-
tion of the IDs is a critical component of the overall scheme.
The following two bullet points outline the Cloud-ID registry
service and how the Cloud Provider is assigning local IDs.
• Global Registration for Cloud-ID: We propose an
approach that is borrowed from registering domain
names. Third party authorities are responsible for as-
suring uniqueness in providing domain names on a per-
top-level domain basis. For the purpose of the C-ID
registration a 3rd party registry is needed to distribute
IDs and to assure their uniqueness. We argue that a
simple registration per cloud provider on a secured
website is sufficient to distribute C-IDs.
• Local Assignment for Service-ID: The S-ID and the
T-ID on the other hand are solely significant within
the cloud providers environment. Hence, they can be
managed by the managed and maintained by the cloud
management systems. It is the combination of the above
three cloud identities that ensures a globally unique
identification of a cloud computing entity (in addition
to IP address and port number).
3) Flexibility to Enable Service-Stacking: Service stack-
ing is an important characteristic in Cloud environments.
More and more services run on top of other services, which
run on IaaS providers. We want to assure that classification
happens for each layer of Services stacked on top of each
other. Hence, a method is required that enables adding
multiple Service-IDs to the Cloud information. By using
IPv6 and extension headers we easily can stack multiple
Service-IDs. Therefore the Service-ID part of the IPv6 Cloud
extension header can contain one or many Service IDs. This
approach allows us to define very granular policies.
4) End User Control Over Classification: As part of the
new Cloud classification scheme we suggest that the end
user should be able to request certain IDs. This provides the
most control to the Tenant, while still providing the ben-
efits to other stakeholders (e.g., cloud provider or network
operators).
Having said that, giving the end-user full control over the
classification limits the benefits to those stakeholders dra-
matically. We therefore propose that within a cloud provider
all IDs are used by default (even if the end-user requested
no classification). The end user only controls if those IDs
are stripped of when the packets leave the cloud provider.
This way, the cloud provider can leverage the classification
while the user keeps control over the identification outside
the cloud provider.
VI. TECHNICAL REALIZATION OF CLOUD-, SERVICE-
& TENANT-ID
We defined three novel identities. The first to uniquely
identify cloud providers globally. The second to uniquely
distinguish services locally in a given cloud. The two
together form a unique global identity for a cloud service.
Optionally, a tenant identity can be added to allow traffic
separation per cloud tenant.
We propose to incorporate the cloud identities in the
header of a Layer 3 packet. Both the IPv4 and the IPv6
protocols provide ways to carry additional information in
packet header(s). Our proposal strictly follows the Layer 3
protocol specifications to ensure that it is fully compatible
with the existing network systems. This not only makes
our proposal feasible and practical, but also reduces the
implementation cost to a minimum.
We focus our implementation example on IPv6 as the
soon-to-be replacement for IPv4. IPv6 is more flexible, as it
supports extension headers, and therefore, can be adjusted as
needed. For backward compatibility we introduce a sample
implementation for IPv4. This implementation is limited to a
single C-ID, S-ID and T-ID, and therefore, does not support
future-proof service stacking.
The implementations for both the IPv6 and IPv4 protocols
are examples and not seen as the only viable implementation
solution.
A. Classification on Layer 2
For cloud internal tenant traffic identification we pub-
lished [12] a conceptual idea introducing a Tenant-ID on
Layer 2. This identity is incorporated into a modified 802.1q
header. The ID is 15 bits in size and has pure cloud provider
internal significance.
The T-ID on Layer 2 is used in combination with VLAN-
IDs. This way a tenant can be uniquely identified while
allowing the segmentation of traffic on a per tenant basis.
We argue that the Layer 2 T-ID is more than just a VLAN-
ID extension as multiple VLANs can be associated to one
Tenant. This allows sub-segmentation of traffic per T-ID.
This approach allows us to maintain the hierarchical ID
scheme proposed in this paper. One Tenant can be associated
to multiple VLANs but not vice versa. Hence, we assure that
traffic within a Cloud Provider is fully segregated between
tenants.
The Tenant-ID can exist on both Layer 2 and Layer 3,
either for traffic within a cloud environment or for traffic
leaving the cloud providers network, respectively.
B. Cloud Header Fields
The following header fields are defined to enable Cloud
classification.
• The Copied field (CP, 1 bit, value=1) specifies the need
to copy the option fields in all fragments.
• The Class field (2 bits, value=0) defines a general
option category. Included for future expansion.
• The Number (5 bits, value=10) field specifies the ID
number “10” of the proposed CLOUD option fields.
• The Length (8 bits, value=64) field defines the total
number of bits of the subsequent data fields.
• We propose a Cloud flag (3 bit) field that allows the
client to indicate interest in CLOUD identities. The
most significant bit identifies the C-ID, the next bit is
used to request the S-ID, and the least significant bit is
used to set the T-ID. Here, we propose that the client
controls what IDs are added to a packet. Therefore the
provider is passive and only fulfills the request of the
client.
The most significant bit indicates whether the C-ID is
present in the optional data fields. The next two bits
trigger the S-ID and the T-ID respectively.
• The Data fields contain all three CLOUD identities.
We propose the following implementation for both IPv6
and IPv4.
C. IPv6
The IPv6 [13] does not allow the addition of optional
fields to the basic header, but it has been designed with
built-in flexibility to add extension header where necessary.
This makes the incorporation of the cloud identities into
IPv6 packets straightforward - we just add a new extension
header.
The IPv6 characteristic of allowing extension headers also
enables one of our proposed features. The service stacking
in cloud environments is as of today mainly limited to
services and tenants. However, in the future that might
change whereby services are running on top of services with
multiple Service-IDs stacked on top of each other. Extension
headers are the ideal way to support a higher degree of
service stacking in the future. Our proposed extension header
is illustrated in Fig. 2. The IPv6 header allows cascading
multiple extension headers. This means that our proposal
will not interfere with the functionality of the IPv6 protocol
and it will not influence the upper-layer protocols. The
IPv6 header allows cascading multiple extension headers.
This means that our proposal is not interfering with the
functionality of the protocol nor does it influence the upper-
layer protocols.
As we focus our research and prototype development on
IPv6, we do not provide further details on the example
implementation for IPv4 networks.
VII. BENEFITS
A. Remote Cloud Service Identification
The main advantage in adding global identities to Layer 3
information is seen by tagging service specific traffic flows.
The proposed solution is versatile enough to support any
kind of services that are based on Layer 3 information.
Adding a third identification mechanism to the already
existing IP addresses and corresponding port numbers adds
granularity in matching and policing traffic.
B. Identity-Based Security
The proposed solution introduces identities into Layer
3 packet headers that allow fine-grained policy matching
according to cloud service affiliations of traffic flows. This
advantage can be leveraged to define security rules on a
per-service basis.
C. Transparency and Backwards Compatibility
The identities introduced on Layer 3 are transparent to
both upper and lower level protocols. This characteristic
allows a step-by-step introduction to existing networks with
an easy to maintain backwards compatibility.
D. Cloud Service Location Awareness
Based on the proposed ID structure the identification
mechanism enables location awareness to traffic tagged for
a specific service. This is seen as an advantage for remote
entities to determine where data/information is accessed and
stored in the Cloud. In addition, service traffic to countries in
violation of certain data privacy regulations can be blocked
based on the location part of the ID.
E. Cloud-ID/Service-ID Spoofing Resistant
The C-ID and the S-ID are added dynamically to traffic
flows. As with IP address on Layer 3 C-IDs and S-IDs pose
the risk of being manipulated by rogue entities between
the sender and the receiver. With the introduction of the
C-ID registry service and the cross-checking of IDs on
the providers site it can be verified if the ID has been
tempered with. Packets with tempered IDs could be marked
malformed on the cloud providers end terminating the traffic
flow completely.
VIII. DISCUSSION
A. Performance Impact
Increasing the size of the IPv6 packet (due to exten-
sion header) might decrease the performance of forwarding
packets inside the cloud provider and the enterprise. The
forwarding across Internet Service Provider networks should
not be affected unless the ISP bases the forwarding decisions
on the Cloud- or Service-ID. Another performance drop
might be seen by processing packets by policies trying to
match against particular services. Here, we argue that the
benefit of matching the traffic for security, forwarding and
billing purposes outranks a slight performance drop.
The additional 16 byte header information have minimal
impact on packets with a standard MTU of 1500 bytes.
B. Compatibility
The framework proposed in this paper is fully compat-
ible with protocols within and outside the cloud provider
network environment. Leveraging the elastic option field or
an additional extension header in IPv4 or IPv6 protocols
respectively eliminates the need for hardware or software
alteration. With the added benefit of full compatibility and
transparency, deploying the identities is voluntary. Leverag-
ing the proposed framework enables certain functions, and
therefore enriches a cloud provider’s portfolio. The benefit
increases proportionally with the adoption of the identities.
Those who do not adopt the solution will operate as normal,
keeping the interoperability with C-ID/S-ID/T-ID enabled
systems.
IX. RELATED WORK
The Enterprise Strategy Group (ESG), on behalf of Ex-
treme Networks, published a white paper discussing the
needs of identity-awareness at the network layer. They argue
that identity at the network is required (1) to meet new
business requirements, (2) legacy networks cannot meet
business needs, and (3) enterprises require identity-aware
networks.
ESG research suggest that the business, regulatory com-
pliance, and security ROI delivered by an identity-aware net-
work eventually triggers the replacement of legacy networks.
The research underdone by ESG is closely aligned to this
paper’s research topic. Their white paper only outlines the
problem space and the need for identity-aware networks;
they do not introduce a solution to this problem.
As part of this research, we recently published a concep-
tual paper introducing the T-ID on Layer 2. This ID has local
relevance to a cloud provider and is crucial in identifying
tenant assets within the cloud network environment. Refer
to reference [12] for further details.
Khoudali et al. [14] and Benzidane et al. [15] propose a
Frame Tag header. Added on Layer 3 at the beginning of
the payload, it identifies tenants and the services used. By
using md5 hash values, the overall packet size increases by
32 bytes. We argue that the proposals by Khoudali et al.
[14] and Benzidane et al. [15] have several limitations.
• The frame-tag for inter-VM traffic inspection is added
on Layer 3. Inter-VM traffic in a cloud data center, how-
ever, is predominantly happening on Layer 2. Devices
in between the VMs are therefore ignoring information
above Layer 2. Forcing traffic across Layer 3 domains
dramatically increases the bandwidth requirements, and
therefore, renders the solution unpractical.
• The approach both papers suggest requires an alteration
in switching hardware and software, making it incom-
patible with existing devices.
• The proposed md5 hash values increase the overall
packet size by at least 32 bytes. In comparison, a typical
IPv4 header is between 20 to 60 bytes large. Adding 32
bytes dramatically increases the processing overhead,
causing delays in a delay sensitive network area.
We can conclude that Khoudalis et al. [14] and Benzi-
danes et al. [15] research point out the need for a unique
tenant and service identities in a cloud environment. How-
ever, the proposed solution has several limitations that make
it unpractical and not feasible for a cloud environment.
Therefore, we have no doubt that their proposed solution
will not solve the problem.
Content-Centric Networking (CCN) [16] [17] [18] is
closely aligned to our research topic. CCNs approach re-
places the ”Where” information in a packet with ”What”
information. This way not the Host itself is identified per
packet but the content or data residing on the host. One of
the major problems in Content-Centric Networking is the
need for a very large routing table that cannot be handled
by current routing protocols in the Internet.
X. FUTURE WORK
We plan to extend our proposal by developing a prototyp-
ing. The prototype will be based Cisco products to assure
the most realistic results in a prototype environment. The
prototype will be used to evaluate potential performance
impacts, show its feasibility and usability in a non-simulated
network.
To extend the classification proposal on Layer 2 of the
OSI model, we suggest to incorporate “Layer 2 extension
headers.” They could be used in a similar way to IPv6 ex-
tension headers, allowing the optional and stacked addition
of Cloud classification information on Layer 2.
Currently, all IDs are visible to all stakeholders within
end-to-end connections. We argue that this is not secure
enough and might raise privacy concerns. We plan to inves-
tigate how certain IDs can be hidden to the different parties
in a Cloud environment (i.e., hiding the tenant ID to the
underlying IaaS provider).
XI. CONCLUSION
With the introduction of Cloud Computing, organizations
need the network to enable full visibility and transparency
of who is using what, where, when and how. Mechanisms
are required to translate business needs to network layer
policies for accurate billing, security aspects or complex re-
source orchestration. With the lack of adequate and granular
classifications, current technology limitations are magnified
and new cloud specific functionalities are restricted.
Previous research has shown that fine-grained classifi-
cation and unique identification has been an issue for a
long time and is getting more and more important with the
introduction of virtualization. Multiple layers of virtualized
hardware resources, service stacking and on-demand elastic
services highlight issues with current technologies such as
address space limitations.
In this paper, we introduce a new classification scheme
to identify Cloud Providers, their services and tenants both
within and outside of a cloud environment. The identifiers,
overall size of 16 bytes, are added as an extension header
in IPv6 or as part of the option field in IPv4. The key
characteristic of the new classification approach can be
summarized as follows:
• validity across boundaries (both Layer 2 and Layer 3)
• enablement of new functions such as accurate billing
or per service/tenant pair security policies
• visibility and transparency on a per-service/per-tenant
basis within a cloud environment
In conclusion, we state that fine-grained classification
is key to enable end-to-end service and tenant isolation.
The proposed concept is generic enough to be used for
other highly-demanded functions within a cloud environ-
ment while eliminating limitations of legacy technologies.
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